# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- """ flask_security.utils ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Flask-Security utils module :copyright: (c) 2012-2019 by Matt Wright. :copyright: (c) 2019-2020 by J. Christopher Wagner (jwag). :license: MIT, see LICENSE for more details. """ import abc import base64 import datetime from functools import partial import hashlib import hmac import sys import time import warnings from contextlib import contextmanager from datetime import timedelta from flask import _request_ctx_stack, current_app, flash, g, request, session, url_for from flask.json import JSONEncoder from flask.signals import message_flashed from flask_login import login_user as _login_user from flask_login import logout_user as _logout_user from flask_login import current_user from flask_login import COOKIE_NAME as REMEMBER_COOKIE_NAME from flask_mail import Message from flask_principal import AnonymousIdentity, Identity, identity_changed, Need from flask_wtf import csrf from wtforms import validators, ValidationError from itsdangerous import BadSignature, SignatureExpired from speaklater import is_lazy_string from werkzeug.local import LocalProxy from werkzeug.datastructures import MultiDict from .quart_compat import best from .signals import ( login_instructions_sent, reset_password_instructions_sent, user_authenticated, user_registered, ) try: # pragma: no cover from urlparse import parse_qsl, parse_qs, urlsplit, urlunsplit from urllib import urlencode except ImportError: # pragma: no cover from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, parse_qs, urlsplit, urlunsplit, urlencode # Convenient references _security = LocalProxy(lambda: current_app.extensions["security"]) _datastore = LocalProxy(lambda: _security.datastore) _pwd_context = LocalProxy(lambda: _security.pwd_context) _hashing_context = LocalProxy(lambda: _security.hashing_context) localize_callback = LocalProxy(lambda: _security.i18n_domain.gettext) PY3 = sys.version_info[0] == 3 if PY3: # pragma: no cover string_types = (str,) # noqa text_type = str # noqa else: # pragma: no cover string_types = (basestring,) # noqa text_type = unicode # noqa FsPermNeed = partial(Need, "fsperm") FsPermNeed.__doc__ = """A need with the method preset to `"fsperm"`.""" def _(translate): """Identity function to mark strings for translation.""" return translate def find_csrf_field_name(): """ We need to clear it on logout (since that isn't being done by Flask-WTF). The field name is configurable withing Flask-WTF as well as being overridable. We take the field name from the login_form as set by the configuration. """ form = _security.login_form(MultiDict([])) if hasattr(form.meta, "csrf_field_name"): return form.meta.csrf_field_name return None def login_user(user, remember=None, authn_via=None): """Perform the login routine. If *SECURITY_TRACKABLE* is used, make sure you commit changes after this request (i.e. ``app.security.datastore.commit()``). :param user: The user to login :param remember: Flag specifying if the remember cookie should be set. Defaults to ``False`` :param authn_via: A list of strings denoting which mechanism(s) the user authenticated with. These should be one or more of ["password", "sms", "authenticator", "email"] or other 'auto-login' mechanisms. """ if remember is None: remember = config_value("DEFAULT_REMEMBER_ME") if not _login_user(user, remember): # pragma: no cover return False if _security.trackable: remote_addr = request.remote_addr or None # make sure it is None old_current_login, new_current_login = ( user.current_login_at, _security.datetime_factory(), ) old_current_ip, new_current_ip = user.current_login_ip, remote_addr user.last_login_at = old_current_login or new_current_login user.current_login_at = new_current_login user.last_login_ip = old_current_ip user.current_login_ip = new_current_ip user.login_count = user.login_count + 1 if user.login_count else 1 _datastore.put(user) session["fs_cc"] = "set" # CSRF cookie session["fs_paa"] = time.time() # Primary authentication at - timestamp identity_changed.send(current_app._get_current_object(), identity=Identity(user.id)) user_authenticated.send( current_app._get_current_object(), user=user, authn_via=authn_via ) return True def logout_user(): """Logs out the current user. This will also clean up the remember me cookie if it exists. This sends an ``identity_changed`` signal to note that the current identity is now the `AnonymousIdentity` """ for key in ("identity.name", "identity.auth_type", "fs_paa", "fs_gexp"): session.pop(key, None) # Clear csrf token between sessions. # Ideally this would be handled by Flask-WTF but... # We don't clear entire session since Flask-Login seems to like having it. csrf_field_name = find_csrf_field_name() if csrf_field_name: session.pop(csrf_field_name, None) # Flask-WTF 'caches' csrf_token - and only set the session if not already # in 'g'. Be sure to clear both. This affects at least /confirm g.pop(csrf_field_name, None) session["fs_cc"] = "clear" identity_changed.send( current_app._get_current_object(), identity=AnonymousIdentity() ) _logout_user() def _py2timestamp(dt): return time.mktime(dt.timetuple()) + dt.microsecond / 1e6 def check_and_update_authn_fresh(within, grace): """ Check if user authenticated within specified time and update grace period. :param within: A timedelta specifying the maximum time in the past that the caller authenticated that is still considered 'fresh'. :param grace: A timedelta that, if the current session is considered 'fresh' will set a grace period for which freshness won't be checked. The intent here is that the caller shouldn't get part-way though a set of operations and suddenly be required to authenticate again. If within.total_seconds() is negative, will always return True (always 'fresh'). This effectively just disables this entire mechanism. If "fs_gexp" is in the session and the current timestamp is less than that, return True and extend grace time (i.e. set fs_gexp to current time + grace). If not within the grace period, and within.total_seconds() is 0, return False (not fresh). Be aware that for this to work, sessions and therefore session cookies must be functioning and being sent as part of the request. .. warning:: Be sure the caller is already authenticated PRIOR to calling this method. .. versionadded:: 3.4.0 """ if within.total_seconds() < 0: # this means 'always fresh' return True if "fs_paa" not in session: # No session, you can't play. return False now = datetime.datetime.utcnow() new_exp = now + grace # grace_ts = int(new_exp.timestamp()) grace_ts = int(_py2timestamp(new_exp)) fs_gexp = session.get("fs_gexp", None) if fs_gexp: # if now.timestamp() < fs_gexp: if _py2timestamp(now) < fs_gexp: # Within grace period - extend it and we're good. session["fs_gexp"] = grace_ts return True # Special case 0 - return False always, but set grace period. if within.total_seconds() == 0: session["fs_gexp"] = grace_ts return False authn_time = datetime.datetime.utcfromtimestamp(session["fs_paa"]) # allow for some time drift where it's possible authn_time is in the future # but lets be cautious and not allow arbitrary future times delta = now - authn_time if within > delta > -within: session["fs_gexp"] = grace_ts return True return False def get_hmac(password): """Returns a Base64 encoded HMAC+SHA512 of the password signed with the salt specified by *SECURITY_PASSWORD_SALT*. :param password: The password to sign """ salt = _security.password_salt if salt is None: raise RuntimeError( "The configuration value `SECURITY_PASSWORD_SALT` must " "not be None when the value of `SECURITY_PASSWORD_HASH` is " 'set to "%s"' % _security.password_hash ) h = hmac.new(encode_string(salt), encode_string(password), hashlib.sha512) return base64.b64encode(h.digest()) def verify_password(password, password_hash): """Returns ``True`` if the password matches the supplied hash. :param password: A plaintext password to verify :param password_hash: The expected hash value of the password (usually from your database) """ if use_double_hash(password_hash): password = get_hmac(password) return _pwd_context.verify(password, password_hash) def verify_and_update_password(password, user): """Returns ``True`` if the password is valid for the specified user. Additionally, the hashed password in the database is updated if the hashing algorithm happens to have changed. N.B. you MUST call DB commit if you are using a session-based datastore (such as SqlAlchemy) since the user instance might have been altered (i.e. ``app.security.datastore.commit()``). This is usually handled in the view. :param password: A plaintext password to verify :param user: The user to verify against .. tip:: This should not be called directly - rather use :meth:`.UserMixin.verify_and_update_password` """ if use_double_hash(user.password): verified = _pwd_context.verify(get_hmac(password), user.password) else: # Try with original password. verified = _pwd_context.verify(password, user.password) if verified and _pwd_context.needs_update(user.password): user.password = hash_password(password) _datastore.put(user) return verified def encrypt_password(password): # pragma: no cover """Encrypt the specified plaintext password. It uses the configured encryption options. .. deprecated:: 2.0.2 Use :func:`hash_password` instead. :param password: The plaintext password to encrypt """ warnings.warn( "Please use hash_password instead of encrypt_password.", DeprecationWarning ) return hash_password(password) def hash_password(password): """Hash the specified plaintext password. Unless the hash algorithm (as specified by `SECURITY_PASSWORD_HASH`) is listed in the configuration variable `SECURITY_PASSWORD_SINGLE_HASH`, perform a double hash - first create an HMAC from the plaintext password and the value of `SECURITY_PASSWORD_SALT`, then use the configured hashing algorithm. This satisfies OWASP/ASVS section 2.4.5: 'provide additional iteration of a key derivation'. .. versionadded:: 2.0.2 :param password: The plaintext password to hash """ if use_double_hash(): password = get_hmac(password).decode("ascii") # Passing in options as part of hash is deprecated in passlib 1.7 # and new algorithms like argon2 don't even support it. return _pwd_context.hash( password, **config_value("PASSWORD_HASH_OPTIONS", default={}).get( _security.password_hash, {} ) ) def encode_string(string): """Encodes a string to bytes, if it isn't already. :param string: The string to encode""" if isinstance(string, text_type): string = string.encode("utf-8") return string def hash_data(data): return _hashing_context.hash(encode_string(data)) def verify_hash(hashed_data, compare_data): return _hashing_context.verify(encode_string(compare_data), hashed_data) def suppress_form_csrf(): """ Return meta contents if we should suppress form from attempting to validate CSRF. If app doesn't want CSRF for unauth endpoints then check if caller is authenticated or not (many endpoints can be called either way). """ ctx = _request_ctx_stack.top if hasattr(ctx, "fs_ignore_csrf") and ctx.fs_ignore_csrf: # This is the case where CsrfProtect was already called (e.g. @auth_required) return {"csrf": False} if ( config_value("CSRF_IGNORE_UNAUTH_ENDPOINTS") and not current_user.is_authenticated ): return {"csrf": False} return {} def do_flash(message, category=None): """Flash a message depending on if the `FLASH_MESSAGES` configuration value is set. :param message: The flash message :param category: The flash message category """ if config_value("FLASH_MESSAGES"): flash(message, category) def get_url(endpoint_or_url, qparams=None): """Returns a URL if a valid endpoint is found. Otherwise, returns the provided value. :param endpoint_or_url: The endpoint name or URL to default to :param qparams: additional query params to add to end of url :return: URL """ try: return transform_url(url_for(endpoint_or_url), qparams) except Exception: # This is an external URL (no endpoint defined in app) # For (mostly) testing - allow changing/adding the url - for example # add a different host:port for cases where the UI is running # separately. if _security.redirect_host: url = transform_url( endpoint_or_url, qparams, netloc=_security.redirect_host ) else: url = transform_url(endpoint_or_url, qparams) return url def slash_url_suffix(url, suffix): """Adds a slash either to the beginning or the end of a suffix (which is to be appended to a URL), depending on whether or not the URL ends with a slash.""" return url.endswith("/") and ("%s/" % suffix) or ("/%s" % suffix) def transform_url(url, qparams=None, **kwargs): """ Modify url :param url: url to transform (can be relative) :param qparams: additional query params to add to end of url :param kwargs: pieces of URL to modify - e.g. netloc=localhost:8000 :return: Modified URL .. versionadded:: 3.2.0 """ if not url: return url link_parse = urlsplit(url) if qparams: current_query = dict(parse_qsl(link_parse.query)) current_query.update(qparams) link_parse = link_parse._replace(query=urlencode(current_query)) return urlunsplit(link_parse._replace(**kwargs)) def get_security_endpoint_name(endpoint): return "%s.%s" % (_security.blueprint_name, endpoint) def url_for_security(endpoint, **values): """Return a URL for the security blueprint :param endpoint: the endpoint of the URL (name of the function) :param values: the variable arguments of the URL rule :param _external: if set to `True`, an absolute URL is generated. Server address can be changed via `SERVER_NAME` configuration variable which defaults to `localhost`. :param _anchor: if provided this is added as anchor to the URL. :param _method: if provided this explicitly specifies an HTTP method. """ endpoint = get_security_endpoint_name(endpoint) return url_for(endpoint, **values) def validate_redirect_url(url): if url is None or url.strip() == "": return False url_next = urlsplit(url) url_base = urlsplit(request.host_url) if (url_next.netloc or url_next.scheme) and url_next.netloc != url_base.netloc: return False return True def get_post_action_redirect(config_key, declared=None): urls = [ get_url(request.args.get("next", None)), get_url(request.form.get("next", None)), find_redirect(config_key), ] if declared: urls.insert(0, declared) for url in urls: if validate_redirect_url(url): return url def get_post_login_redirect(declared=None): return get_post_action_redirect("SECURITY_POST_LOGIN_VIEW", declared) def get_post_register_redirect(declared=None): return get_post_action_redirect("SECURITY_POST_REGISTER_VIEW", declared) def get_post_logout_redirect(declared=None): return get_post_action_redirect("SECURITY_POST_LOGOUT_VIEW", declared) def get_post_verify_redirect(declared=None): return get_post_action_redirect("SECURITY_POST_VERIFY_VIEW", declared) def find_redirect(key): """Returns the URL to redirect to after a user logs in successfully. :param key: The session or application configuration key to search for """ rv = ( get_url(session.pop(key.lower(), None)) or get_url(current_app.config[key.upper()] or None) or "/" ) return rv def propagate_next(url): # return either URL or, if URL already has a ?next=xx, return that. url_next = urlsplit(url) qparams = parse_qs(url_next.query) if "next" in qparams: return qparams["next"][0] return url def get_config(app): """Conveniently get the security configuration for the specified application without the annoying 'SECURITY_' prefix. :param app: The application to inspect """ items = app.config.items() prefix = "SECURITY_" def strip_prefix(tup): return (tup[0].replace("SECURITY_", ""), tup[1]) return dict([strip_prefix(i) for i in items if i[0].startswith(prefix)]) def get_message(key, **kwargs): rv = config_value("MSG_" + key) return localize_callback(rv[0], **kwargs), rv[1] def config_value(key, app=None, default=None): """Get a Flask-Security configuration value. :param key: The configuration key without the prefix `SECURITY_` :param app: An optional specific application to inspect. Defaults to Flask's `current_app` :param default: An optional default value if the value is not set """ app = app or current_app return get_config(app).get(key.upper(), default) def get_max_age(key, app=None): td = get_within_delta(key + "_WITHIN", app) return td.seconds + td.days * 24 * 3600 def get_within_delta(key, app=None): """Get a timedelta object from the application configuration following the internal convention of:: Examples of valid config values:: 5 days 10 minutes :param key: The config value key without the `SECURITY_` prefix :param app: Optional application to inspect. Defaults to Flask's `current_app` """ txt = config_value(key, app=app) values = txt.split() return timedelta(**{values[1]: int(values[0])}) def send_mail(subject, recipient, template, **context): """Send an email via the Flask-Mail extension. :param subject: Email subject :param recipient: Email recipient :param template: The name of the email template :param context: The context to render the template with """ context.setdefault("security", _security) context.update(_security._run_ctx_processor("mail")) sender = _security.email_sender if isinstance(sender, LocalProxy): sender = sender._get_current_object() msg = Message(subject, sender=sender, recipients=[recipient]) ctx = ("security/email", template) if config_value("EMAIL_PLAINTEXT"): msg.body = _security.render_template("%s/%s.txt" % ctx, **context) if config_value("EMAIL_HTML"): msg.html = _security.render_template("%s/%s.html" % ctx, **context) if _security._send_mail_task: _security._send_mail_task(msg) return mail = current_app.extensions.get("mail") mail.send(msg) def get_token_status(token, serializer, max_age=None, return_data=False): """Get the status of a token. :param token: The token to check :param serializer: The name of the seriailzer. Can be one of the following: ``confirm``, ``login``, ``reset`` :param max_age: The name of the max age config option. Can be on of the following: ``CONFIRM_EMAIL``, ``LOGIN``, ``RESET_PASSWORD`` """ serializer = getattr(_security, serializer + "_serializer") max_age = get_max_age(max_age) user, data = None, None expired, invalid = False, False try: data = serializer.loads(token, max_age=max_age) except SignatureExpired: d, data = serializer.loads_unsafe(token) expired = True except (BadSignature, TypeError, ValueError): invalid = True if data: user = _datastore.find_user(id=data[0]) expired = expired and (user is not None) if return_data: return expired, invalid, user, data else: return expired, invalid, user def check_and_get_token_status(token, serializer, within=None): """Get the status of a token and return data. :param token: The token to check :param serializer: The name of the serializer. Can be one of the following: ``confirm``, ``login``, ``reset``, ``us_setup`` :param within: max age - passed as a timedelta :return: a tuple of (expired, invalid, data) .. versionadded:: 3.4.0 """ serializer = getattr(_security, serializer + "_serializer") max_age = within.total_seconds() data = None expired, invalid = False, False try: data = serializer.loads(token, max_age=max_age) except SignatureExpired: d, data = serializer.loads_unsafe(token) expired = True except (BadSignature, TypeError, ValueError): invalid = True return expired, invalid, data def get_identity_attributes(app=None): app = app or current_app attrs = app.config["SECURITY_USER_IDENTITY_ATTRIBUTES"] try: attrs = [f.strip() for f in attrs.split(",")] except AttributeError: pass return attrs def uia_phone_mapper(identity): """ Used to match identity as a phone number. This is a simple proxy to :py:class:`PhoneUtil` See :py:data:`SECURITY_USER_IDENTITY_MAPPINGS`. .. versionadded:: 3.4.0 """ ph = _security._phone_util.get_canonical_form(identity) return ph def uia_email_mapper(identity): """ Used to match identity as an email. See :py:data:`SECURITY_USER_IDENTITY_MAPPINGS`. .. versionadded:: 3.4.0 """ # Fake up enough to invoke the WTforms email validator. class FakeField(object): pass email_validator = validators.Email(message="nothing") field = FakeField() setattr(field, "data", identity) try: email_validator(None, field) except ValidationError: return None return identity def use_double_hash(password_hash=None): """Return a bool indicating whether a password should be hashed twice.""" # Default to plaintext for backward compatibility with # SECURITY_PASSWORD_SINGLE_HASH = False single_hash = config_value("PASSWORD_SINGLE_HASH") or {"plaintext"} if password_hash is None: scheme = _security.password_hash else: scheme = _pwd_context.identify(password_hash) return not (single_hash is True or scheme in single_hash) def csrf_cookie_handler(response): """ Called at end of every request. Uses session to track state (set/clear) Ideally we just need to set this once - however by default Flask-WTF has a time-out on these tokens governed by *WTF_CSRF_TIME_LIMIT*. While we could set that to None - and OWASP implies this is fine - that might not be agreeable to everyone. So as a basic usability hack - we check if it is expired and re-generate so at least the user doesn't have to log out and back in (just refresh). We also support a *CSRF_COOKIE_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST* analogous to Flask's *SESSION_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST* It is of course removed on logout/session end. Other info on web suggests replacing on every POST and accepting up to 'age' ago. """ csrf_cookie = config_value("CSRF_COOKIE") if not csrf_cookie or not csrf_cookie["key"]: return response op = session.get("fs_cc", None) if not op: remember_cookie_name = current_app.config.get( "REMEMBER_COOKIE_NAME", REMEMBER_COOKIE_NAME ) has_remember_cookie = ( remember_cookie_name in request.cookies and session.get("remember") != "clear" ) # Set cookie if successfully logged in with flask_login's remember cookie if has_remember_cookie and current_user.is_authenticated: op = "set" else: return response if op == "clear": response.delete_cookie( csrf_cookie["key"], path=csrf_cookie.get("path", "/"), domain=csrf_cookie.get("domain", None), ) session.pop("fs_cc") return response # Send a cookie if any of: # 1) CSRF_COOKIE_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST is true # 2) fs_cc == "set" - this is on first login # 3) existing cookie has expired send = False if op == "set": send = True session["fs_cc"] = "sent" elif config_value("CSRF_COOKIE_REFRESH_EACH_REQUEST"): send = True elif current_app.config["WTF_CSRF_TIME_LIMIT"]: current_cookie = request.cookies.get(csrf_cookie["key"], None) if current_cookie: # Lets make sure it isn't expired if app doesn't set TIME_LIMIT to None. try: csrf.validate_csrf(current_cookie) except ValidationError: send = True if send: kwargs = {k: v for k, v in csrf_cookie.items()} kwargs.pop("key") kwargs["value"] = csrf.generate_csrf() response.set_cookie(csrf_cookie["key"], **kwargs) return response def base_render_json( form, include_user=True, include_auth_token=False, additional=None, error_status_code=400, ): has_errors = len(form.errors) > 0 user = form.user if hasattr(form, "user") else None if has_errors: code = error_status_code payload = json_error_response(errors=form.errors) else: code = 200 payload = dict() if user: # This allows anonymous GETs via JSON if include_user: payload["user"] = user.get_security_payload() if include_auth_token: # view wants to return auth_token - check behavior config if ( config_value("BACKWARDS_COMPAT_AUTH_TOKEN") or "include_auth_token" in request.args ): token = user.get_auth_token() payload["user"]["authentication_token"] = token # Return csrf_token on each JSON response - just as every form # has it rendered. payload["csrf_token"] = csrf.generate_csrf() if additional: payload.update(additional) return _security._render_json(payload, code, headers=None, user=user) def default_want_json(req): """ Return True if response should be in json N.B. do not call this directly - use security.want_json() :param req: Flask/Werkzeug Request """ if req.is_json: return True # TODO should this handle json sub-types? accept_mimetypes = req.accept_mimetypes if not hasattr(req.accept_mimetypes, "best"): # pragma: no cover # Alright. we dont have the best property, lets add it ourselves. # This is for quart compatibility setattr(accept_mimetypes, "best", best) if accept_mimetypes.best == "application/json": return True return False def json_error_response(errors): """ Helper to create an error response that adheres to the openapi spec. """ # Python 2 and 3 compatibility for checking if something is a string. try: # pragma: no cover basestring string_type_check = (basestring, unicode) except NameError: # pragma: no cover string_type_check = str if isinstance(errors, string_type_check): # When the errors is a string, use the response/error/message format response_json = dict(error=errors) elif isinstance(errors, dict): # When the errors is a dict, use the DefaultJsonErrorResponse # (response/errors/name/messages) format response_json = dict(errors=errors) else: raise TypeError("The errors argument should be either a str or dict.") return response_json class FsJsonEncoder(JSONEncoder): """ Flask-Security JSON encoder. Extends Flask's JSONencoder to handle lazy-text. .. versionadded:: 3.3.0 """ def default(self, obj): if is_lazy_string(obj): return str(obj) else: return JSONEncoder.default(self, obj) @contextmanager def capture_passwordless_login_requests(): login_requests = [] def _on(app, **data): login_requests.append(data) login_instructions_sent.connect(_on) try: yield login_requests finally: login_instructions_sent.disconnect(_on) @contextmanager def capture_registrations(): """Testing utility for capturing registrations. """ registrations = [] def _on(app, **data): registrations.append(data) user_registered.connect(_on) try: yield registrations finally: user_registered.disconnect(_on) @contextmanager def capture_reset_password_requests(reset_password_sent_at=None): """Testing utility for capturing password reset requests. :param reset_password_sent_at: An optional datetime object to set the user's `reset_password_sent_at` to """ reset_requests = [] def _on(app, **data): reset_requests.append(data) reset_password_instructions_sent.connect(_on) try: yield reset_requests finally: reset_password_instructions_sent.disconnect(_on) @contextmanager def capture_flashes(): """Testing utility for capturing flashes.""" flashes = [] def _on(app, **data): flashes.append(data) message_flashed.connect(_on) try: yield flashes finally: message_flashed.disconnect(_on) class SmsSenderBaseClass(object): __metaclass__ = abc.ABCMeta def __init__(self): pass @abc.abstractmethod def send_sms(self, from_number, to_number, msg): # pragma: no cover """ Abstract method for sending sms messages .. versionadded:: 3.2.0 """ return class DummySmsSender(SmsSenderBaseClass): def send_sms(self, from_number, to_number, msg): # pragma: no cover """ Do nothing. """ return class SmsSenderFactory(object): senders = {"Dummy": DummySmsSender} @classmethod def createSender(cls, name, *args, **kwargs): """ Initialize an SMS sender. :param name: Name as registered in SmsSenderFactory:senders (e.g. 'Twilio') .. versionadded:: 3.2.0 """ return cls.senders[name](*args, **kwargs) try: # pragma: no cover from twilio.rest import Client class TwilioSmsSender(SmsSenderBaseClass): def __init__(self): self.account_sid = config_value("SMS_SERVICE_CONFIG")["ACCOUNT_SID"] self.auth_token = config_value("SMS_SERVICE_CONFIG")["AUTH_TOKEN"] def send_sms(self, from_number, to_number, msg): """ Send message via twilio account. """ client = Client(self.account_sid, self.auth_token) client.messages.create(to=to_number, from_=from_number, body=msg) SmsSenderFactory.senders["Twilio"] = TwilioSmsSender except Exception: pass def password_length_validator(password): """ Test password for length. :param password: Plain text password to check :return: ``None`` if password conforms to length requirements, a list of error/suggestions if not. .. versionadded:: 3.4.0 """ if len(password) < config_value("PASSWORD_LENGTH_MIN") or len(password) > 128: return [ get_message( "PASSWORD_INVALID_LENGTH", length=config_value("PASSWORD_LENGTH_MIN") )[0] ] return None def password_complexity_validator(password, is_register, **kwargs): """ Test password for complexity. Currently just supports 'zxcvbn'. :param password: Plain text password to check :param is_register: if True then kwargs are arbitrary additional info. (e.g. info from a registration form). If False, must be a SINGLE key "user" that corresponds to the current_user. All string values will be extracted and sent to the complexity checker. :param kwargs: :return: ``None`` if password is complex enough, a list of error/suggestions if not. Be aware that zxcvbn does not (easily) provide a way to localize messages. .. versionadded:: 3.4.0 """ if config_value("PASSWORD_COMPLEXITY_CHECKER") == "zxcvbn": import zxcvbn user_info = [] if not is_register: for v in kwargs["user"].__dict__.values(): if v and isinstance(v, str): user_info.append(v) else: # This is usually all register form values that are in the user_model if kwargs: user_info = kwargs.values() results = zxcvbn.zxcvbn(password, user_inputs=user_info) if results["score"] > 2: # Good or Strong return None # Should we return suggestions? Default forms don't really know what to do. if results["feedback"]["warning"]: # Note that these come from zxcvbn and # aren't localizable via Flask-Security return [results["feedback"]["warning"]] return [get_message("PASSWORD_TOO_SIMPLE")[0]] else: return None def password_breached_validator(password): """ Check if password on breached list. Does nothing unless :py:data:`SECURITY_PASSWORD_CHECK_BREACHED` is set. If password is found on the breached list, return an error if the count is greater than or equal to :py:data:`SECURITY_PASSWORD_BREACHED_COUNT`. :param password: Plain text password to check :return: ``None`` if password passes breached tests, else a list of error messages. .. versionadded:: 3.4.0 """ pwn = config_value("PASSWORD_CHECK_BREACHED") if pwn: try: cnt = pwned(password) if cnt >= config_value("PASSWORD_BREACHED_COUNT"): return [get_message("PASSWORD_BREACHED")[0]] except Exception: if pwn == "strict": return [get_message("PASSWORD_BREACHED_SITE_ERROR")[0]] return None def default_password_validator(password, is_register, **kwargs): """ Password validation. Called in app/request context. N.B. do not call this directly - use security._password_validator """ notok = password_length_validator(password) if notok: return notok notok = password_breached_validator(password) if notok: return notok return password_complexity_validator(password, is_register, **kwargs) def pwned(password): """ Check password against pwnedpasswords API using k-Anonymity. https://haveibeenpwned.com/API/v3 :return: Count of password in DB (0 means hasn't been compromised) Can raise HTTPError Only implemented for python 3 .. versionadded:: 3.4.0 """ def convert_password_tuple(value): hash_suffix, count = value.split(":") return hash_suffix, int(count) sha1 = hashlib.sha1(password.encode("utf8")).hexdigest() if PY3: import urllib.request import urllib.error req = urllib.request.Request( url="https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/{}".format(sha1[:5].upper()), headers={"User-Agent": "Flask-Security (Python)"}, ) # Might raise HTTPError with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as f: response = f.read() raw = response.decode("utf-8-sig") entries = dict(map(convert_password_tuple, raw.upper().split("\r\n"))) return entries.get(sha1[5:].upper(), 0) raise NotImplementedError()